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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
courts. If, however, the courts of North Carolina determine that greater
specificity is required by NCRCP 8(a) (1) than by FRCP 8(a) (2), the
use of the 12(e) motion in place of the one under 12(b) (6) and the
liberal allowance of amendments are recommended as methods of insuring
a balanced and equitable system.
ROGER GROOT
Constitutional Law-Illegality of Police Program To Gather
Information on Civil Disorders
In Anderson v. Sills1 a New Jersey Superior Court held that a state-
sponsored program of information-gathering about civil disorders and
the participating groups and individuals was an unconstitutional infringe-
ment of the plaintiffs' rights of free speech and assembly. The state
attorney general had ordered preparation of two forms for use by local
police departments.
One, the "Security Incident Report Form," was designed to gather
information on any "civil disturbance, riot, rally, protest, demonstration,
march or confrontation," including "the names of organizations or groups
involved, leaders, and the type of organization. ' 2 The "Security Sum-
106 N.J. Super. 545, 256 A.2d 298 (Super. Ct. 1969).
Id. at 548, 256 A.2d at 300. An excerpt from the report's "instructions for
preparation" illustrates its breadth:
9. TYPE OF INCIDENT-Enter the type of incident. EXAMPLES: Civil
disturbance, riot, rally, protest, demonstration, march, confrontation, etc.
10. LOCATION-Type the location of the incident. If business or residence,
the number and name of street, road, lane or avenue. If open area, give
approximate distance to a known geographic location.
11. REASON OR PURPOSE OF INCIDENT-Enter reason for incident
or alleged purpose.
12. NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS-List estimated or announced number
of participants or anticipated participants.
13. ORGANIZATIONS AND/OR GROUPS INVOLVED-Give full
names and addresses of organizations and/or groups involved. If more
space is needed, use Narrative.
14. LEADERS-Enter names, addresses and titles, if any, of leaders of
organizations and/or groups involved. Include nicknames, aliases, and
other identifying data.
17. NARRATIVE
a. Information previously included elsewhere on this report need not be
repeated in the Narrative.
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mary Report" recorded the "date and place of birth, marital status, name
of spouse, age, race, physical description, occupation and employer, motor
vehicle record ' and other characteristics of participants in the activity who
might therefore be suspected of involvement in future civil disorders. A
result of the apprehension induced by recent racial upheavals, the avowed
purpose for the reports was prediction and control of potential disorders.4
The court, taking judicial notice that some of the individual plain-
tiffs5 had been involved in sit-ins and civil rights activities, did not require
them to allege that they had actually been subjected to any surveillance or
reporting, but followed the federal "concepts of standing in First Amend-
ment cases [that] have had the effect of constituting individual litigants
quasi-attorneys general for large classes of citizens whose rights might
otherwise be oppressed." 6 The plaintiffs sought and obtained a judgment
declaring the reporting system unconstitutional per se and ordering that
the reports be discontinued and that all forms and files be destroyed.
The court found
"that the directive in question, and Forms 420 [Security Incident
Report] and 421 [Security Summary Report] as used therewith,
are violative of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution
in that they overreach in their attempt to achieve what is probably
a legitimate governmental goal . . . . The exercise of power which
deters individuals from exercising First Amendment rights is denied
to government."8
b. If an organization and/or group is involved in the incident reported,
include type and how involved.
EXAMPLES OF TYPES: Left wing, Right wing, Civil Rights,
Militant, Nationalistic, Pacifist, Religious, Black Power, Klu [sic] Klux
Klan, Extremist, etc.
EXAMPLES OF HOW INVOLVED: Sponsor, co-sponsor, sup-
porter, assembled group, etc.
Id. at 559-60, 256 A.2d at 306-07.
8 Id. at 552-53, 256 A.2d at 302.
'Id. at 551-52, 256 A.2d at 301-02. The Attorney General introduced excerpts
from the report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders urging
improvements in police intelligence procedures as valuable aids in preventing
and controlling disorders to justify the reporting procedure. See Momboisse, Riot
Prevention and Survival, 45 CHI.-KENT L. Rav. 143 (1969), in which the need for
adequate police intelligence activity is stressed.
" Plaintiffs in this case were the local NAACP chapter and individual members
of the chapter who had been involved in civil rights activities. 106 N.J. Super.
at 545, 550-51, 256 A.2d at 298, 301.
0 Id. at 551, 256 A.2d at 301.
Id. at 557-58, 256 A.2d at 305. This case was an action under the New Jersey
declaratory judgment statute.8 Id. at 556-57, 256 A.2d at 304.
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It is useful to review briefly the more important precedent cited by
the court in support of its decision. Such analysis will reveal an implicit
extension of first-amendment freedoms in the New Jersey court's holding.
Dombrowski v. Pfister,' cited by the court to support its decision on
standing as well as its determination on the merits, involved an attempt
by Louisiana to apply state anti-sedition statutes to individuals and
associations working for equal rights for Negroes.1" The Supreme Court,
deciding that the federal district court should not abstain from hearing
the complaint, held that the Louisiana statutes under which the plaintiffs
had been arrested and indicted were unconstitutionally vague and overly
broad since they created a zone "within which protected expression may
be inhibited.""
In Lamont v. Postmaster General,'2 the Supreme Court held that a
statute requiring potential recipients of "communist political propaganda"
to request its delivery in writing unduly limited first-amendment freedom
to receive mail."3 Mr. Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, concluded
that the statute was "unconstitutional because it requires an official act
(viz., returning the reply card) as a limitation on the unfettered exercise
of the addressee's First Amendment rights."' 4
The state court's contempt conviction of the National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People for failing to produce a list of its
members was reversed in NAACP v. Alabama.", The Supreme Court,
noting the possibility of private reprisal and threats, held that the forced
disclosure would impair the ability of members to pursue their legitimate
aims and dissuade other individuals from joining the organization in
contravention of the first-amendment right to freedom of association.10
NAACP v. Button involved an attempt by Virginia to expand its
definition of solicitation of legal business to preclude the plaintiffs from
encouraging and supporting litigation aimed at eliminating racial dis-
- 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
'
0 id. at 482.
11Id. at 494.12381 U.S. 301 (1965).
'8 The right to receive mail was considered an integral part of freedom of
speech. Id. at 308 (Brennan, J., concurring).
"Id. at 305.
12357 U.S. 449 (1958).
"Id. at 462-63, 466. The Court derived a freedom of association from the
related freedoms of speech and assembly specifically granted by the first amend-
ment. Id. at 460. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430-31 (1963).
"371 U.S. 415 (1963).
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crimination. The Supreme Court found that plaintiff's conduct was a
form of speech protected by the first amendment and that the state's
attempt to make it unlawful could not be sustained.' 8
The Supreme Court was fundamentally concerned in each of the above
cases with examining the chilling effect the governmental action had on
the exercise of first-amendment rights; once a sufficient inhibition was
demonstrated, the state's interest yielded. Considered in this light, the
cases cited by the New Jersey court provide a sound basis for its holding
in Anderson: there can be no doubt that the attorney general's reporting
system was a form of state action having the potential effect of dis-
couraging individuals from a constitutionally-protected pursuit of legiti-
mate aims. But by not requiring the plaintiffs to show an actual threat
giving rise to a chilling effect on first-amendment rights, the court in
Anderson reached beyond any of these cases. In both Dombrowski and
Button it was the existence of criminal statutes, likely to be invoked against
plaintiffs for their exercise of protected rights, that gave rise to an actual
threat. In Lamont, the most recent of the cases, the majority of the
Supreme Court went to some lengths in its opinion to point out the
affirmative obligation that the statute imposed on the addressee before he
could receive certain mail."9 Even in NAACP v. Alabama, in which there
was no claim that the state statutes involved were unconstitutional on their
face, the Court relied in part on the demonstrated probability of "economic
reprisal, loss of employment .. . [and] physical coercion '" if the state
were permitted to force disclosure of membership lists through contempt
proceedings.
In contrast to Dombrowski and Button there was no real threat of
prosecution for engaging in protected activities in Anderson, for while
the investigation of activities such as sit-ins and protest marches was
the medium for obtaining information, the purported uses of that informa-
tion were limited to preventing riots and civil disorders,2 which are
surely not protected speech and assembly. Unlike Lamont and NAACP v.
Alabama, there was no affirmative action required of the plaintiffs before
they could carry out protected activities. Moreover, it does not appear in
Anderson that there was any showing of possible intimidation or har-
11 Id. at 437. Virginia argued without success that the restraint was only
incidental to the legitimate pursuit of the state's goal of ensuring high professional
standards for the legal profession. Id. at 438.
", 381 U.S. at 305, 307.20 357 U.S. at 464.
"1 106 N.J. Super. at 552-53, 256 A.2d at 302.
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rassment by state agencies either in obtaining the information or in its
later use.
Although the court in Anderson recognized "that plaintiffs and others
may well be subjected to abuse as a result of this intelligence system," 22
the main thrust of its conclusion is that such files are inherently dangerous
since the mere knowledge of their existence tends to inhibit advocation of
social and political change. 3 If any chilling effect similar to that found
in the cases that the court cited is to be found in Anderson, it must rest
on a judicial inference that the police will misuse information contained
in their files or will harrass and intimidate individuals while collecting
it.24 Granting that such an inference may be justified if required for the
protection of first-amendment freedoms, one must still consider whether
it is always necessary or desirable in light of public-policy decisions
favoring police functions of crime prevention and detection.
If police limited their activities to investigation of reported crimes
after the occurrence, their operations would rarely be disturbed by charges
of repression and abuse of power; the first amendment would never be
the gravamen of a complaint against police excesses. Perhaps unfor-
tunately, however, the law arms the police with conspiracy statutes and
expects them to stop crime in its incipiency without furnishing clear-cut
guidelines of acceptable methods of prevention. One of the most effective
crime-prevention tools is the information-collection system condemned in
Anderson.25
The harm caused to first-amendment freedoms by such a system is
twofold: first, the knowledge that the police are noting people's presence
at a particular event may dissuade individuals from participating in legal
political activity and discussion; second, police presence at gatherings
tends to inhibit participants from speaking out as freely as they otherwise
might.26 A more serious problem arises when the police use clandestine
22 Id. at 557, 256 A.2d at 304-05.
Id. at 556-57, 256 A.2d at 304.
2The court obviously gave some credence to this possibility: "[T]he probability
that it [the directive to gather information] will be interpreted by some as re-
questing investigations of political trouble makers is too apparent." Id. at 557,
256 A.2d at 304. "[P]laintiffs and others may well be subjected to abuse as a result
of this intelligence system." Id., 256 A.2d at 305.
2 See Momboisse, supra note 4.
26 This precise deterrent effect came before a federal district court in Local
309, United Furniture Workers v. Gates, 75 F. Supp. 620 (N.D. Ind. 1948).
Following picket-line violence, state and local police began attending-but did not
actively interfere with-union meetings in the county courthouse. The union mem-
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surveillance or infiltration of groups to obtain information. Unless the
presence of the police is realized at some point, there is no inhibition of
the exercise of first-amendment freedoms absent a general, persisting fear
that an informer may be present. Moreover, it is seldom possible to attack
covert surveillance successfully on fourth- or fifth-amendment grounds un-
less there has been some trespass, and this affirmative remedy is not
available if the infiltrator's presence is at least tacitly condoned,2 7 as is the
case at public meetings.
Granting that harm flows from the knowledge that the police are
engaging in information-collecting, is it really essential to impute to
them either bad motives or harrassing tactics to find a judicial basis for
stopping or limiting such activities?28 Since the harm to the plaintiffs
in Anderson was solely in their individual reaction and not in the possi-
bility of affirmative state action against them, the court was, in effect,
protecting a right to exercise in privacy first-amendment rights. By
recognizing a distinction between protecting the freedom to exercise first-
amendment rights and protecting a right of privacy from governmental
intrusion, and accepting Anderson as a case involving the right to privacy,
bers sought and obtained an injunction prohibiting the police from attending the
meetings on the basis that such attendance "restrained and hampered those who
had thus met in lawful and peaceful assembly." Id. at 625.
17 Considering the assiduous efforts of the courts to protect individuals from
invasions of privacy by electronic and mechanical surveillance methods, the un-
restricted leeway given unaided eavesdroppers and informers is surprising. Compare
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S.
41 (1967) with Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966), in which the
Supreme Court upheld a conviction based on testimony from an informer and
did not consider it significant that the police probably had introduced him into
the group. See also Osborne v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966) and Lewis
v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966). The latter decisions have been criticized:
The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, 81 HARv. L. REv. 69, 193-94 (1967); Note,
.Tudcial Control of Secret Agents, 76 YALE L.J. 994 (1967). The acceptance of
the use of eavesdroppers and informers perhaps stems from the difficulty in formu-
lating a theory placing "overhearing" within any category of state activity presently
held to violate enumerated rights or freedoms, but it should not be overlooked that
the cases permitting eavesdropping did not involve first-amendment freedoms and
might have been decided differently if they had. The Court in Katz held that a
physical trespass was not necessary for finding an illegal search and seizure by
electronic bugging and used language that could be equally applied to unaided
eavesdropping.
" Besides furthering an obvious policy conflict by resting decisions on imputa-
tions of bad faith, courts would seem to be guilty of that old legislative mistake of
overbreadth since this inference, once applied, cannot logically be limited to reports
of the type involved in Anderson, but must be applied to all information-gathering
and use of official records.
1970]
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the court could have avoided trying to find a deterrent effect based on
possible police misbehavior. 29
The existence of a right to privacy in exercise of certain first-amend-
ment freedoms has clearly been accepted by the Supreme Court.30 When
an attack on governmental activity is based on a violation of this right
to privacy, plaintiff does not bear the burden of proving an additional
affirmative, deterrent state activity; it is sufficient to show only an in-
vasion of privacy and a lack of justification for that invasion. Indeed,
once an investigation into protected activities is shown, the burden
is then on the state to justify it.31 The court in Anderson came very
close to accepting a right to privacy in the exercise of both actual
and symbolic speech, and the case has been interpreted by one writer as
authority for such a right. 2 If this interpretation is correct, Anderson
brings the judiciary one step closer to accepting the suggestion by Mr.
Justice Douglas3 3 that the proper solution is to adopt a "right to be let
alone" and to establish that until an organization or individual acts
illegally, no governmental unit should be authorized or allowed to investi-
gate. A less drastic suggestion is to place information collected by sur-
veillance and infiltration on the same basis as wiretapping and to require
prior judicial approval by use of warrants84 before evidence obtained as
a result of such police action can be used in any court.
The injunctive remedy granted in Anderson, depending as it does on
11 The court came close to adopting this approach: "[I]t is not too difficult to
imagine the reluctance of an individual to participate in any kind of protected
conduct which seeks publicly to express a particular or unpopular political or
social view because of the fact that by doing so he might now have a record ......
106 N.J. Super. at 556, 256 A.2d at 304. "I conclude that plaintiffs' complaint, that
they do not want to be investigated and the subject of central surveillance as
potential problems, bears merit." Id. at 557, 256 A.2d at 304. But cf. note 24
supra.
"See, e.g., DeGregory v. Attorney Gen., 383 U.S. 825, 829 (1966); Gibson
v. Florida Legis. Inves. Comm'n, 372 U.S. 539, 544 (1963,); Talley v. California,
362 U.S. 60, 65 (1960) ; NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) ; United
States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 57-58 (1953) (concurring opinion). See also Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
S See Gibson v. Florida Legis. Inves. Comm'n, 372 U.S. 539 (1963); cf.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). See also Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347 (1967) for application of this principle to a fourth-amendment situation.
" Schlam, Police Intimidation Through "Surveillance" May be Enjoined as an
Unconstitutional Violation of Rights of Assembly and Free Expression, 3 CLEAR-
INGHOUSE REV. 130, 157 (1969).
Douglas, The Right of Association, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 1361 (1963).
"The Legitimate Scope of Police Discretion to Restrict Ordinary Public
Activity, 4 HIv. Civ. RIGHTs-Civ. LiB. L. REv. 233, 341 (1969).
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affirmative action initiated by the plaintiff, will not provide relief from
pervasive covert collection of information. The combination of an ex-
clusionary evidentiary rule, based on the requirement of a warrant, and
injunctive relief would, however, be a potent weapon for discouraging
police activities likely to stifle the free and open exercise of the rights of
freedom of speech, assembly, and association. Since surveillance would
be permitted only if the need for it could be demonstrated to a judicial
officer, the police would not be forced into illegal conduct to carry out
the investigative and preventive activities demanded of them by society.
DONALD W. HARPER
Constitutional Law-Power of Congress To Exclude Persons
Duly Elected
In the congressional elections of 1966, Adam Clayton Powell was
duly elected to the Ninetieth Congress from the eighteenth congressional
district of New York. When the House of Representatives convened,
Powell was not administered the oath. On the same day, the House pro-
vided for the appointment of a select committee to determine Powell's
eligibility to take his seat.'
The committee found that Powell met the standing qualifications of
article I, section 2 of the Constitution.' The committee further reported,
however, that Powell had misappropriated public funds, had made false
reports on expenditures of foreign currency, and had asserted unwarranted
privilege and immunity from the processes of the courts of New York.'
The committee recommended that Powell be sworn and seated, but that
he be fined 40,000 dollars, censured, and deprived of his seniority.'
When the proposed resolution was presented to the House, an amend-
ment was offered calling for Powell's exclusion and a declaration that
his seat was vacant.5 After heated debate, the amendment was adopted,
1113 CONG. REc. 16 (daily ed. Jan. 10, 1967).
'H.R. REP. No. 27, 90th Cong., lst Sess. 31 (1967). The relevant part of
article I, § 2 declares:
"[n]o person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to
the Age of twenty-five years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United
States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in
which he shall be chosen."
'H.R. REP. No. 27, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 31-32 (1967).
'Id. at 33.
'H.R. Res. 278, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 113 CONG. REc. 4997, 5020 (1967).
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